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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. MORTENSEN,
and ALFRED TREDWAY,
Respondents,
vs.
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a Utah
corporation, CLEO H. BULLARD, and RICHARD DON
CAFFERTY.
Appellants.

Case No. 8551

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah, Joseph E. Jeppson, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CA'SE
This is an action for libel and slander. The
respondents, Richard H. Mortensen and Alfred
Tredway, claim that the appellants, Life Insurance
Corporation of America, Cleo H. Bullard and
Richard Don Cafferty, defamed them resulting
in general and special damages. The case was tried
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Utah. ·Trial 'vas before Judge Joseph E. Jeppson
an·d a jury. The trial Judge denied the motion of
the appellants, Life Insurance Corporation of America, Cleo H. Bullard, and Richard Don Cafferty
to dismiss the respondents Complaint, at the close
of Respondents Case, upon the ground of privileged
communication. The trial Judge also denied appellants' motion for a directed verdict. The jury rendered a verdict against the appellants, Life Insurance Corporation of America, Bullard, and Cafferty and found that the plaintiff Tredway suffered
general damages in the sum of $500.00 and the
respondents, Mortensen suffered general damages
in the sum of $1,000.00, and that the plaintiffs,
Mortensen and Tredway, suffered special damages
in the sum of $5,000.00 and the jury awarded the
plaintiff jointly as prominant damages the sum of
$2,000.00. A counterclaim of the appellant Life
Insurance Corporation of America, which was reserved, resulted in a judgment for the defendant,
Life Insurance Corporation of America against
Richard H. Mortensen in the sum of 42.05 and
judgment against the respondent, Alfred Tredway,
in the sum of $540.70. Judgment was entered on the
verdict on the 7th day of June, 1956. Notice of
Appeal was filed on the 28th day of June, 1956. The
Designation of Record was filed on the lOth day
of August, 1956 and Order Extending the Record
2
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on Appeal to the 14th day of November, 1956, was
entered on the 11th day of October, 1956. An Order
extending the time for appellants brief to December
24, 1956, was entered on the 7th day of December,
1956.
STAITEMEN T OF FACTS
For convenience: The plaintiff, Richard H.
Mortensen shall hereinafter be referred to as Mortensen. The plaintiff, Alfred Tredway, shall hereinafter be referred to as Tredway. The defendant
Life Insurance Corporation of America, shall hereinafter be referred to as Licoa. The defendant,
Richard Don Cafferty, shall hereinafter be referred
to as Cafferty. The defendant, Charles P. Connally
shall hereinafter be referred to as Connally. The
Reliance National Life Insurance Company, the
name of which appears hereinafter in the testimony,
shall hereinafter be referred to as Reliance.
Mortensen and Tredway were employed by
Licoa in the latter part of 1954. Subsequent to their
employment by Licoa, they entered into negotiation
of a contract of employment with Reliance.
On October 13, 1954 Mortensen and Tredway
were licensed by the Insurance Department of the
State of Utah under Reliance. On October 15, 1954,
Licoa wrote a letter to the Insurance Department
stating the licenses of Mortensen and Tredway
should be terminated. The letter stated that the
1

3
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licenses should be cancelled with prejudice, that
Mortensen and Tredway had acted against the best
interest of the company, and each had a debit balance with the company. The Insurance Department
informed the President of Reliance of the letter
from Licoa and placed the burden of whether or
not the licenses of Mortensen and Tredway under
Reliance should continue on the President of Reliance. The Insurance Department terminated the
licenses of Mortensen and Tredway under Licoa.
The President of Reliance entered into a contract
with Mortensen and Tredway other than a contract
which they had been negotiating at the time of receipt of the information of the President of Reliance
from the Insurance Commissioner concerning the
letter from Licoa. Mortensen and Tredway then
filed this action against Licoa, Bullard, and Cafferty and seeking damages on the grounds that they
had been defamed. The jury returned a verdict
against Licoa, Bullard, and Cafferty awarding Mortensen and Tredway damages in the sum of $8,500.00. This appeal was taken from the refusal of the
trial Judge to dismiss the cause of action of Mortensen and Tredway at the close of their case and
a motion for a directed verdict against Mortensen
and Tredway.
Mortensen started to work for Licoa about
August 15, 1954. (R 185). Tredway was first em-
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ployed by Licoa about the middle of September,
1954 (R 207-208).
About the first week of October, 1954 (R 93
& R 187) Mortensen and Tredway approached ~e
liance for an agency directors position (R 186). Mr.
Salisbury, President of Reliance (R 92), at the first
meeting with Mortensen and Tredway said that it
would be necessary to investigate Mortensen and
Tredway thoroughly before anything was done about
a contract (R 93). Mr. Salisbury also stated that
Mortensen and Tredway should investigate Reliance
(R 93).
Salisbury then investigated Mortensen and
Tredway and at a second meeting of Mortensen and
Tredway and Salisbury, Salisbury said it looked
like an agency supervisor ·contract could be entered
into with Mr. Mortensen and Tredway (R 94). No
contract was made at the time of the second meeting
(R 94).
Between the time- of the second meeting and a
third meeting of Mortensen and Tredway and Salisbury, Salisbury received a call from the State Insurance Department ( R 95). The call was from
Mrs. Burns, the license clerk of the State Department of Insurance (R 97). Mrs. Burns informed
Salisbury about a letter from Licoa which set out
the termination with prejudice of the license of Mortensen and Tredway (R 97). Salisbury saw the let5
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ter at a later date in the file of the State Insurance
Commissioners office ( R 97).
At a third meeting of Mortensen, Tredway, and
Salisbury, about the 17th or 20th of October, the
fact that Salisbury had received some information
would make it inadvisable for him as President of
teh company to enter into a general supervisory
contract with Mortensen and Tredway (R 98), a
·general supervisory contract would have to be based
on a general agency contract until Mortensen and
Tredway could prove that they were capable of
handling the job (R 98).
Mortensen and Tredway were licensed by Reliance on October, 13, 1954 (R 107). Mortensen was
licensed under Reliance up u11til the tir.ae of the
trial of this action (R 106-107). Tredway was licensed by Reliance through March, 1955 (R 74) at
which time he was dismissed because of a conflict of
personalities ( R. 211-212).
Cafferty made a statement to Btlllard and Licoa that while Mortensen and Tredway were en1ployed by Licoa they atten1pted to recruit salesmen
of Licoa to go to work for Reliance (R 14) and that
Mortensen and Tredway had sent samples of sales
materials of Licoa's to Reliance (R 14). These statements of Cafferty caused Bullard to write the Insurance Commissioner a letter ( R 17) . The letter
written by Bullard was as follows:
6
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"Also please cancel with prejudice the
licenses of Alfred B. Tredway and R. H. Mortensen, whose actions were not in the best
interest of the company. Our books indicate
an agency debit of $89.75 on R. H. Mortensen, and $428 on A. B. Tredway." (R 189)
The letter vvas dated October 15, 1954 (R 1 &
R4).

The jury returned a special verdict finding as
follows: The defendant Cafferty made a statement
to the defendant Bullard and the defendant Licoa
saying that while Mortensen and Tredway wei'e
employed by Licoa they atten1pted to recruit salesmen of Licoa to go to work for Reliance and (R 14)
that such statement (R 15) was false~ That Cafferty made a statement to Bullard and Licoa that
Mortensen and Tredway had sent samples of the
sales material of Licoa to Reliance (R 14). That the
statement of Cafferty that Mortensen and Tredway
while agents for Licoa, attempted to recruit salesrnen from Licoa to go to work for Reliance defaming the defendants Mortensen and Tredway (R 16)
and the statement of Cafferty that the plaintiffs
sent samples of sales materials to Reliance also
defamed Mortensen and Tredway ( R 16). That the
statements of Cafferty concerning the recruiting
of salesmen and the furnishing of samples of sales
materials to Reliance vvere the proximate cause of
the writing and mailing of the letter from Bullard
7
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and Licoa to the Insurance Commissioner ( R 17) .
That lVIortensen and Tredway did not act against
the best interest of Licoa (R 18). The jury found
that there was a debit balance on the books of the
company Licoa on October 14, 1954 but that Mortensen had no debit balance on the books of the company on October 15, 1954 ( R 18). That the statement that Tredway had a debit balance did not defame him, (R 19) but the statement Mortensen had
a debit balance on the books of the company did defame him. That the statement that Mortensen (R
19) and Tredway did not act in the best interest of
the ·company defamed both Mortensen and Tredway
(R 19). It was found that at least one of the statements which defamed Mortensen and Tredway were
made maliciously by Cafferty ( R 20). That the
letter sent the Insurance Commissioner sent by Bullard and Licoa was written with malice on the part
of Bullard. The jury awarded as follows: The plaintiff, Tredway, $500.00 general damages (R 21).
The plaintiff Mortensen $1,000.00 general damages.
Special damages for loss of a supervisory contract
with Reliance was awarded to Mortensen and Tredway in the sum of $5,000.00 (R 21) and as punative
damages Mortensen and Tredway were awarded
the sum of $2,000.00 jointly. (R 21).

8
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STATEMENT OF POINT
POINT I
IT IS THE DU'TY OF THE INSURER TO PRESERVE INVI'OLATE THE INTEGRITY OF INSURANCE. A LETTER FROM AN INSURER TO THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER MAKING C H A R G E S
AGAINST AGENTS GOING TO THEIR ELIGIBILITY
TO WORK UNDER A LICENSE UNDER A DIFFERENT COMPANY, SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED IN THE INTEREST OF PUBLIC POLICY,
AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE TO
DENY A MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BASED UPON A COMMUNICATION SENT
IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF INSURANCE.

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS THE DUjTY OF THE INSURER TO PRESERVE INVIOLATE THE INTEGRITY OF INSURANCE. A LE'TTER FROM AN INSURER TO THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER MAKING CHARGES
AGAINST AGENTS GOING TO THEIR ELIGIBILITY
TO WORK UNDER A LICENSE UNDER A DIFFER~
ENT COMPANY, SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED IN THE IN!TEREST OF PUBLIC POLICY,
AND TT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE TO
DENY A MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BASED UPON A COMMUNICATION SENT
IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING THE INTE.GRITY OF INS'URANCE.

On October 15, 1954 Mortensen and Tredway
were licensed as agents of Reliance and Licoa. On
that date, Bullard wrote to the Insurance Commissioner requesting the termination of their license
under Licoa. Coupled with the request for termination of the license with Licoa were certain allegations in the nature of a complaint against Mortensen and Tredway. The Complaint was treated by
the Insurance Department as a complaint to a suf. .
ficient degree that it was the basis of a telephone
call by the insurance department to Reliance, the
other company under which Mortensen and Tredway were licensed. The insurance department left
any decision to be made up to the discretion of Reliance. Had the complaint beeh treated properly
by the Insurance Department and had a proper
10
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hearing been held, there would have been no question
as to absolute privilege of the communication from
Licoa to the Insurance Commissioner. The failure
of the Insurance Department to observe proper procedure, and instead leaving the determination of
the continuance of the licenses of Mortensen and
·Tredway to Reliance, should not be the basis of destroying absolt1te privilege of communication of
complaints to the Insurance Commissioner and the
allowing of a recovery by Mortensen and Tredway
against those reporting to the Insurance Department a proper complaint. To deny absolute privilege
to such communications destroys the intent and
purpose of the Insurance Code in controlling agents.
The communication should be given the same absolute privilege as a complaint filed in a proper court
but which does not state a cause of action. Such
absolute privilege is essential to the preservation of
proper policing of the insurance industry.
:T hat the insurance business is affected by public interest and it is the duty of the insurer to preserve inviolate the integrity of insurance as shown
by the provisions of Section 31-1-8 UCA, 1953
which provided as follows:
Section 31-1-8, U CA ( 1953) provides :
"GOVERNMENTAL REGULAIT ION
Within the intent of this code the business of insurance is one affected with the
public interest, requiring that all persons be
11
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actuated by good fait4, abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all
insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the insured and their representatives rests the duty
of pr~serving inviolate the integrity of insurance.''
Mortensen and Tredway were licensed by Reliance on October 13, 1954. On October 15, 1954 a
letter was sent to the Insurance Commissioner cancelling their license with Licoa. The letter contained
the following language:
"Also please cancel with prejudice the licenses of Alfred B. Tredway and R. H. Mortensen, whose actions were not in the best
interest of the company. Our books indicate
an agency debit of $89.75 on R. H. Mortensen, and $428 on A.B. Tredway."
'That such was a charge against Mortensen
and Tredway going to their eligibility to work for
Reliance can be seen upon analysis of the letter and
the facts which occured. Cancellation with prejudice in that the relationship between the insurer
and the agent was not as it should be, namely a good
relationship. Such a bad relationship can reflect on
the company which is a part of the insurance industry and in turn reflecting on the industry in a
bad light which is contrary to the intent and meaning of the Insurance Code.
Not working in the best interest of the company gives rise to an inference that it would place
1
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Licoa, a part of the insurance business, in disrepute.
Placing a company in disrepute has repercussions
throughout the insurance business. It being a matter
of common knowledge in that the failure or failures
of one insurance company can shake the faith of
the public in the insurance business as a whole.
This again is contrary to the intent and purpose
of the Insurance Code.
Setting out the debit balance also goes to the
ability of Mortensen and !Tredway to serve the industry. The debit balance shown could have arisen
from any of several ways. The manner in which a
debit balance has arisen should be discovered and
corrected. Further, a deficiency left unpaid in a
small company is in itself not in the best interest
of the company. Such a deficiency affects the financial standing of a small company adversely
which can affect the industry as a whole because
of the repercussions which can occur.
The Insurance Department was aware of the
question raised going to the ability of Mortensen
and 'Tredway to act as agents. 'The act of the Insurance Department calling Reliance and informing
that company of the charges made and leaving the
decision up to Reliance of whether or not Reliance
wanted to continue them as agents leaves no other
conclusions to be drawn than that the letter was interpreted as a charge against Mortensen and Tred13
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way's qualifications to be licensed to work for another company.
It should be pointed out that there is a distinction to be made between the cancellation of Mortensen's and Tredway's licenses under Licoa and a
charge going to their ability to work for Reliance.
Upon receipt of the letter from Licoa, the Insurance Department could have chosen one of the
following courses of conduct: ( 1) ;The insurance
commissioner could have issued an order to Mortensen and ·Tredway for them to show cause why
the license under Reliance should not be cancelled.
A hearing could have then been had, and a determination of fact been made. Such procedure would
have all of the ear marks of a quasi-judicial proceeding.
(2) The Insurance Commissioner could have
ordered a hearing and based upon findings of such
hearing entered an appropriate order and, if such
were warranted, Mortensen and Tredway licenses
could have been revol{ed. This again would have
been a quasi-judicial proceeding.
( 3) The Insurance Commissioner could have
revoked the licenses of both Mortensen a11d Tredway
and given each of then1 notice. Mter the notice of
such revocation Mortensen and Tredway could have
demanded a hearing as provided by the code and
upon such hearing l1ad their license reinstated or
14
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.•

the revocation continue in effect. This would have
been analogous to the Complaint having been filed,
a default judgment entered, and a motion having
been made for renewal of the default. This apparent
reason for the provision under this procedure under
the Code is to permit the Insurance Commissioner
to take immediate action to prevent persons not
conducting themselves properly from continuing
their misconduct. While it is a summary proceeding
it is no less quasi-judiciaL Under the above possible
procedures to have been followed, the letter from
Licoa to the department is analogous to a complaint
being filed in a law suit. A hearing is provided for,
a determination based upon such hearing is provided
for, an appropriate written order is provided for,
and an Appeal can be taken. Such a complaint
should be absolutely privileged.
The possible action of an order to show cause
could have been had under the following provisions
of UCA, ( 195'3) :
Section 31-4-4. POWERS OF A COMMISSIONER-HEARINGIS
( 1) 'The commissioner may hold a hearing
for any purpose he deems proper.
Section 31-4-5 SHOW CAUSE NOTICE
( 1) If any person is entitled to a hearing
by any provision of this code before any proposed action is taken, the notice of the proposed action may be in the form of a notice to
15
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show cause stating that the proposed action
may be taken unless such perso!l ~~ows. cause
at a hearing to be held as specified In the
notice, why the proposed action should not
be taken.
The possible procedure by way of ordering a
hearing could have 'been had under the provisions
of Section 31-4-1 set out above.
The procedure for the revocation of the license
and the demand for hearing are provided for by
the following code provisions.
Section 31-17-50, UCA (1953) provides:
."LICEN'SE - SUSPENSION, REVOCATION
OR DENIAL-GROUNDS
( 1) :The commissioner may suspend,
revoke, or refuse to renew any license issued
under this chapter or any surplus line broker's license as provided for in chapter 15 of
this code, or for any of the following causes:
(a) for any cause for which issuance
of the license could have been refused had it
then
existed and been known to the commis.
sioner;
(b) if the licensee wilfully violates or
knowingly participates in the violation of any
provision of this code ;
(c) * * * *
(d) * * * *
(e) if the licensee has, with intent to
deceive, materially misrepresented the terms
of effect of any insurance contract; or has
16
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engaged or is about to engage in any fraudulent transaction;
(f)
(g)

* * * *
* * * *

(h) if in the conduct of his affai~s under the license, the licensee has shown himself
to be, and is so deemed by the commissioner,
incompetent, or untrustworthy, a source of
injury and loss to the public;
Section 31-4-1, UCA (1953) provides:
POWERS OF COMMISSIONER-HEARINGS
(1)

(2)

*
*

*
*

*
*

*
*

(1)

*

*

*

*

He shall hold a hearing
( 1 ) if required by any provision of this
code, or
(2) upon written demand for a hearing made by any person aggrieved by any act
or threatened act or failure of the commissioner to act, if such failure is deemed an act
under any provision of this code, or by any
r~port, promulgation or order of the commissioner.
(2)
(3)

*
*

*
*

*
*

*
*

The questions to 'be answered with regard to
absolute privilege are ( 1) whether or not an occasion existed or the statement and (2) whether or
not the matter complained of was pertinent to the
17
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occasion. Absolute privilege is given those occasions
which are so important to the public good that the
law holds that nothing which may be written with
probable cause under the sanction of the occasion
with probable cause, whether with or without malice
can be libel. The pertinency of the matter to the
occasion determines the question of whether or not
the privilege applies. The Insurance Code of- the
State of Utah regulates the issuance, renewal and
revocation of licenses for agents. The commissioner
of insurance is given full jurisdiction in the premises. The inquiry is limited to the cause shown or
the charge made. A test of the pertinency is afforded. The party complainant is involved in the showing of good cause for the revocation of the license.
A hearing by the insurance commissioner is provided for. The hearing involves an opposite party,
namely, the defendant or agent whose license is
being revoked. The hearing provided for is a legal
hearing and notice to the defendant is in1plied and
specifically provided for. The act with respect to the
revocation of the insurance agent's license clothes
the Insurance Commissioner with attributes similar
to those of a court and i11 effect makes the Insurance Commissioner a court to detern1ine the matter
of revocation.
The privilege or in1n1unity applies wherever
there is an authorized inquiry which, though not
18
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before a court of justice, is before a tribunal which
has similar attributes. The basis of privilege is public policy. The commissioner with respect to agent's
licenses has the attributes similar to those of a court,
and public policy requires that immunity be accorded to the statements of the parties too, and witnesses in an investigation of this sort.
Persons dealing with insurance agents are uninformed persons and the procedure for the granting and revocation of agent's license is for the protection of such people. The Insurance Commissioner
should have every facility for informing himself as
to insurance agents, their conduct, their character
and everything concerning the agent which may
have some bearing on his conduct in dealing with
the uninformed persons of the general public. One
of the facilities that should be afforded the Insurance Commissioner and the procedure for the revocation of licenses as well as the granting of licenses
is that of privilege of comrnunication to the Insurance Commissioner.
Insurance companies and others interested in
the conduct of agents and the insurance industry
and those dealing with the insurance industry should
be encouraged to bring to the attention of the Insurance Commissioner the derilection of such agents.
The intent of Title 31, UCA ( 1953) to protect insurers and the general public would be obstructed,
19
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if those instituting or participating in proceedings
to bring about the revocation of the license of an
unworthy agent may be subjected by reason of their
statements to suit for libel or a suit for slander. The
statute throws around such proceeding before the
Insurance Commissioner safeguards similar to those
hedging proceedings before a court of justice. There
should be the same immunity in both tribunals.
In this case, the occasion for the statements
by the agents of the defendant company was the
written request for the revocation of the licenses
of the plaintiffs. Such occasion was in the nature
of the commencement of a proceeding before the
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Utah. The
matter complained of was pertinent to the occasion.
The inferences which were drawn by the plaintiffs
in this action tend to point out the character of
those persons whose licenses should be terminated
and to whom licenses to solicit applications for insurance should be denied, that such is pertinent to
the proceeding involved should need no elaboration.
The very purpose of the provisions of the code with
respect to the licensing of agents indicate that only
persons having the character to deal with the general
public should be granted a license.
See, Independent Life Insurance Con1pany v.
Rodgers, Sup. Ct. of Te11n., 1933, 55 S W 2nd 767,
where an agent had gone to work for a second com20
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pany and the first company complained of a deficiency and it was held there was absolute privilege
as to the letter to the Insurance Commissioner.
Also see, Independent Life Insurance Company
v. Hunter, Sup. Ct. of 'Tenn., 1933, 63 S.W. 2nd 668,
where it was held there was conditional privilege
only as the agent had not been licensed under another company and as a result the insurance commissioner did not have jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
Mortensen and Tredway were licensed as agents
for two companies, Licoa and Reliance. Licoa r~
quested the cancellation of Mortensen and Tredway
licenses under Licoa. Coupled with the cancellation
of the licenses under Licoa was a charge going to
the ability of Mortensen and Tredway to be licensed
as agents of the other company and all companies.
That the charge went to their ability to serve as
agents is evidenced by the conduct of the Insurance
Department and the conduct of Reliance. Writings
made in quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged. The charge made was a charge made in
a quasi-judicial proceedings and should be absolutely
privileged. To hold that the communication from
Licoa to the Insurance Commissioner is not absolutely privileged would prevent all companies from
making complaints against agents and would have
the affect of destroying the procedure set up for
the policing of agents of insurers and the public
would be denied the protection provided by the procedure.
Respectfully subn1itted,

REESE C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Appellants
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